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A "Fair and Expeditious" Trial: A Reappraisal of
Slobodan Milosevic's Right to Self-Representation
before the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia
Constantinos Hotis*
Slobodan Milosevic elected to conduct his own defense in his initial
appearance before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
2
Yugoslavia ("ICTY" or "Tribunal").' The Trial Chamber granted the request
and later reaffirmed the right to self-representation, 3 explaining that the rights of
the accused could not be "infringed" even in the interests of a "fair and
expeditious trial."4 It was careful to emphasize, however, that there may be
certain "circumstances" when the appointment of counsel would be necessary.'
Circumstances clearly changed at the ICTY. The Trial Chamber frequently
postponed its proceedings because poor cardiovascular health prevented
Milosevic from directing his own defense even with a reduced working schedule.
It responded by assigning Steven Kay and Gillian Higgins to assume control
over Milosevic's defense 6 "in the interests of justice."' In reaching this decision,
the Tribunal weighed competing interests and concluded that the need to

1

AB 2001, The University of Chicago; MPhil 2003, Trinity College, University of Cambridge; JD
Candidate 2006, The University of Chicago.
Milosevic stated: "I consider this Tribunal a false Tribunal and the indictment a false indictment.
It is illegal being not appointed by the UN General Assembly, so I have no need to appoint
counsel to [sic] illegal organ." Transcript of Record at 2, Prosecutorv Milosevic, Case No IT-99-37-I
(July 3, 2001).

2

Id.

3

Transcript of Record at 14574, Prosecutorv Milosevic, Case No IT-99-37-I (Dec 18, 2002).

4

Prosecutor v Milosevic, Case No IT-02-54, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution Motion
Concerning Assignment of Counsel, 41 (Apr 4, 2003).

5

Id at

6
7

40.
Prosecutorv Milosevic, Case No IT-02-54-T, Order on the Modalities to Be Followed by Court
Assigned Counsel (Sept 3, 2004).
Transcript of Record at 32358, Prosecutorv Milosetic, Case No IT-02-54 (Sept 2, 2004).
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conduct a "fair and expeditious" trial superseded Milosevic's right to selfrepresentation.8
The decision to impose counsel on Milosevic was affirmed on appeal. 9 The
Appeals Chamber reasoned that assigning counsel ensured that the trial would
close within a reasonable amount of time,1 ° but sharply criticized and reversed

the modalities 1 of the order
because they relegated Milosevic to a "visibly
12
second-tier role in the trial.'

Following the Tribunal's order, defense witnesses declined to testify13 and
Milosevic refused to cooperate.' 4 In light of these difficulties, Milosevic's counsel
requested to be relieved of their duties to avoid violating the code of ethics
governing defense counsel at the ICTY. The Trial Chamber rejected their
motion, maintaining that the "presence of assigned counsel is essential to ensure
the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings."' 5
This Development analyzes and critiques recent cases on Milosevic's in
propria persona defense. Contrary to some arguments that the assignment of
counsel will aid the trial process, 16 it contends that the ICTY cannot impose
counsel because all of the reasons that it used to justify its ruling are inadequate.
This Development specifically argues that the "fair and expeditious" rationale,
with its emphasis on judicial management, does not legitimize the Tribunal's
decision to retract Milosevic's right to self-representation. In fact, it is a poor

8

Prosecutor v Milosevic, Case No IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence
Counsel,
64-65 (Sept 22, 2004).

9

Prosecutor v Milosetic, Case No IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial
Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel,
14-15 (Nov 1, 2004).

10

Id.

11

The "modalities" of an order in ICTY jurisprudence refer to the details of the order. In other
words, the "modalities" set out how the order will be put into effect.
Milosevic, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal at 16.

12
13
14
15

16

Transcript of Record at 32832-33, Prosecutorv Milosevic, Case No IT-02-54 (Sept 15, 2004).
Id at 32843. Many of these defense wimesses refused to testify because they disagreed with the
Trial Chamber's decision to impose counsel. Id.
Prosecutor v Milosevic, Case No IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel's Motion for
Withdrawal,
26 (Dec 7, 2004). A motion for an interlocutory appeal on the issue was denied.
Prosecutorv Miloseic, Case No IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel Request for Certification
of an Interlocutory Appeal against the Decision on Assigned Counsel Motion for Withdrawal
(Dec 17, 2004). The President of the ICTY has affirmed this decision in Prosecutorv Milosevic, Case
No IT-02-54-T, Decision Affirming the Registrar's Denial of Assigned Counsel's Application to
Withdraw (Feb 7, 2005).
Judith Armatta, Justice, Not a Political Plafform, for Miloseic, Intl Herald Trib 6 (Oct 8, 2004). See
Nina H.B. Jorgensen, The Right of the Accused to Self-Representation before International Criminal
Tribunals, 98 Am J Intl L 711, 726 (2004) (arguing that the right to self-representation must be
checked under certain circumstances before the Milosevic developments unfolded).
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proxy for justice and may countervail any type of fairness that the ICTY wishes
to achieve in its proceedings. This Development concludes that the Tribunal
should formally sustain Milosevic's right to self-representation so as to bolster its
own legitimacy and positively influence the acceptance of present and future
international tribunals.
To these ends, the Development is divided into three parts. In the First
Section, the Development will piece together and analyze the various rationales
that the ICTY used to justify the imposition of counsel. There will be a
corresponding focus on cases outside of the ICTY, particularly from other war
crimes tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR") and the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL"). These arguments
will be critically assessed and ultimately rejected in the Second Section. The
Third Section will question the adequacy and application of the "fair and
expeditious" rationale to impose counsel on Milosevic. In a brief Conclusion,
the reasons for rejecting the recent decisions from the ICTY will be reassessed.
I. "FAIR AND EXPEDITIOUS" AND OTHER REASONS FOR
IMPOSING COUNSEL AT THE ICTY

The Appeals Chamber recognized that individuals before the ICTY have a
presumptive right to self-representation. 17 Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY Statute")
expressly provides that an individual has the right "to defend himself in person
or through legal assistance of his own choosing."'" The Appeals Chamber
concluded that the "binary opposition" in the statute between "in person" and
"through legal assistance" indicates that the defendant has a right to lead apro se
defense if he chooses. 9 To further substantiate its interpretation, the Tribunal
inferred that the inclusion of the right of self-representation in Article 21 is
significant because it is on a "structural par ' 20 with other fundamental rights that
Article 21 enumerates such as the rights to remain silent 2' and to a speedy trial.22

17
18

Milosevic, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal at 11.
Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (2004) (hereinafter

21

"ICTY Statute"), available online at <http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm>
Oct 27, 2005).
Miloseti4, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal at 11.
Id.
ICTY Statute, art 21, § (4)(g) (cited in note 18).

22

Id at art 21, § (4)(c).

19
20

Winter 2006
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The Appeals Chamber nevertheless asserted that the right to selfrepresentation was not "categorically inviolable."2 3 It supported this conclusion
by drawing from dicta in the United States Supreme Court case, California v
Faretta, that propose that self-representation may be curtailed if a defendant
deliberately obstructs judicial proceedings.24 Citations to several civil law
jurisdictions and common law countries in sexual offense cases prohibiting
defendants from conducting their own defense further supported that
proposition. 2' The Appeals Chamber also relied on a case from its
jurisdiction, Prosecutor v Sese, 26 and a recent case from the SCSL, Prosecutor v
Norman,i" to demonstrate that there is precedent for limiting a defendant's right
to apro se defense in war crimes tribunals.28
Rule 80(B) of the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence 29 also figured
prominently in the opinion. The Appeals Chamber emphasized the significance
of the location of the self-representation and "in his presence" rights within the
same section of Article 21. Since the "in his presence" requirement can be
limited whenever circumstances threaten the management of the trial pursuant
to Rule 80(B), the Tribunal deduced that a pro se defense may be retracted for
similar reasons.3 1 It noted that any "substantial trial disruption" regardless of
intent authorizes it to override a defendant's right to a pro se defense.3 2 As

23

Milosetic, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal at

24

Id, citing Farettav California, 422 US 806, 834 n 46 (1975).

25

Id. For a similar discussion, see Miloseyic, IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision at TT 46-49.

26

Prosecutorv Sese/j, Case No IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing
Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defence (May 9, 2003). In imposing stand-by counsel
on the accused, the Tribunal stated that the "right to self-representation ... is not absolute." Id at
1 20.
Prosecutor v Norman, Case No SCSL-04-14-T-125, Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga
Norman for Self-Representation under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court (une 8,
2004). The Court held that one "has a right to self-representation, but that such a right, being
qualified and not absolute, could, in the light of certain circumstances, be derogated should the
interests of justice so dictate." Id at 30.
Milosevic, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal at 12.

27

28

12.

29

The ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2005) are available online at
<http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005). Rule 80(B) reads: "The
Trial Chamber may order the removal of an accused from the courtroom and continue the
proceedings in the absence of the accused if the accused has persisted in disruptive conduct
following a warning that such conduct may warrant the removal of the accused from the
courtroom."

30

Milosevic, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal at

31

Id.

32

Id at

13.

14.
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Milosevic's poor health qualified as a disruption, the Appeals Chamber found
33
adequate grounds to curtail Milosevic's pro se defense.
The Trial Chamber likewise evaluated the rights of the accused against the
Tribunal's obligation to efficiently manage cases. While the Trial Chamber
predicated its analysis on various cases, 34 Articles 203' and 2136 of the ICTY
Statute were the cornerstones of its decision. 37 In its interpretation, the purpose
of Article 21 is to provide a "fair" trial to the accused. 38 The rights to defend "in
person" and "through legal assistance" in Article 21(4)(d) are methods that
guarantee fairness as they facilitate and develop the defendant's case. 39 Any
interference with this process perpetrates a "miscarriage of justice" that requires
a judicial remedy. 40 The Trial Chamber therefore considered that it had the
authority to assign counsel because Milosevic's decision to lead a pro se defense

33

Milosevic's health problems resulted in the loss of sixty-six days over the course of two years
during the prosecution's case-in-chief. Even during periods of relatively good health, the court
schedule was reduced to allow Milosevic to recuperate per doctors' orders. Following the close of
the prosecution's case on February 25, 2004, the start of the defense's case was repeatedly
postponed. Milosevic began delivering his opening statement on August 31, 2004-over six
months after the close of the Prosecution's case. Id at TT 4-5.

34

like the Appeals Chamber, it relied on Prosecutor v Norman and Prosecutor v Sesej. Milosevic, IT-0254-T, Reasons for Decision at 9 39, 41. In addition, the Trial Chambers drew support from
Prosecutor v BarqyagwiZa, Case No ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to
Withdraw, 27 (Nov 2, 2000) in which the Trial Chamber refused defense counsel's request to be
withdrawn from the case, and Croissantv Germany, 237 Eur Ct HR (set A) at 32 (1992), available
online at <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=695613&
portal=hbkm&source=extemalbydocnumber&table= 1132746FF1 FE2A468ACCBCD 1763D4D8
149> (visited Oct 27, 2005) in which the European Court for Human Rights validated the
imposition of a third counsel over the accused's objection. Miloseic, IT-02-54-T, Reasons for
Decision at TT 40, 43.

35

"The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are
conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights
of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses."
"4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present Statute, the

36

accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality... (d) to be tried
in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing;
to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him
in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it."
37

38

This reflexive approach to interpreting the ICTY Statute is a characteristic of ICTY jurisprudence.
See, for example, Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No IT-94-1, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses (Aug 10, 1995). The Tribunal stated
that it would balance the right to a fair and public trial against the rights of witnesses to protection
"within the context of its own unique legal framework." ld at 27.
Milosevic, IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision at 29.

39

Id at

32.

40

Id at

33.
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had interfered with the procedural and substantive fairness of the proceeding
and would have continued to do so if left unchecked. 4'
Both chambers differed on the modalities of their respective orders
imposing counsel. The Appeals Chamber maintained that the Trial Chamber's
order 42 violated the "proportionality principle" because it ignored the relative
stability of Milosevic's health.4" Based on this evidence, the Appeals Chamber
called for a "working regime that minimizes the practical impact of the formal
assignment of counsel" that allows defense counsel to exercise greater control
only when Milosevic cannot actively participate at trial. 4 The Trial Chamber
subsequently upheld these modalities, insisting that counsel could serve the
interests of their client without violating any ICTY procedures even though it
knew that cooperation from Milosevic would not be forthcoming.4
The ICTY struck a balance between two competing interests: selfrepresentation and a "fair and expeditious" trial. In sum, the ICTY legitimized
its decision because it believed its responsibility to conduct "fair and
expeditious" trials was its "fundamental duty., 46 Milosevic's otherwise valid right
to proceed pro se yielded to this "fundamental duty" because it adversely
impacted judicial efficiency.47
The emphasis on "fair and expeditious" trials appears to be a leitmotiv of
ICTY jurisprudence. In its decision to appoint standby defense counsel, the Sesej
tribunal argued that "the Tribunal has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the
trial proceeds in a timely manner without interruptions, adjournments or
disruptions. '" ' 8 The Kunarac tribunal decided that "the Chambers possess an
inherent power to control the proceedings in such a way as to ensure that justice
41
42

43

Id at

32-34.
According to the Trial Chamber, Milosevic could "continue to participate actively in the conduct
of his case" and even appoint counsel if he wished. Milosevk, IT-02-54-T, Order on the Modalities
2-3. The Trial Chamber carefully enumerated the specific duties that the defense counsel
at
must perform, which included the duty to "act throughout in the best interests of the Accused."
Id at 1.
Milosevic, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal at

17-18.

44

Id at T 19.

45

Milosevic, IT-02-54-T, Decision on Assigned Counsel's Motion at

46

Milosevic, IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision at

47

Commentators writing before the imposition of counsel on Milosevic seem to agree with the
result. See, for example, Salvatore Zappal , Human RIgbts in International Criminal Proceedings 64
(Oxford 2003) ("Notwithstanding the difficulties arising out of such a scenario, the cooperation
of an accused should never be considered a condition for the trial to proceed. .... Assigning a
lawyer to the accused when the interests of justice so require may be the best way to reconcile the
interests of justice with the right of the accused to a fair trial."); Jorgensen, 98 Am J Ind L at 726
(cited in note 16).

48

Sesej, IT-03-67-PT at

17-26.

65.

21.
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is done and to deal with conduct which interferes with the Tribunal's
administration of justice."4 9 The Delalic tribunal took notice of its obligation to
"control its proceedings in such a way as to ensure that justice is done and,
particularly in relation to matters of practice, that the trial proceeds fairly and
expeditiously" when it held that the counsel could not be withdrawn just days
before the case was to go to trial. 5 °
Like the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL have understood fairness in terms
of judicial economy and management. The Barayagwia tribunal denied a defense
counsel motion to be withdrawn from a case by arguing that its decision ensured
that the "Accused receives a fair trial."'" "The aim," the tribunal explained, "is to
obtain efficient representation and adversarial proceedings."5 2 Judge
Gunawardana forcefully argued in a concurring opinion that Article 20(4)'s focus
on the "interest of justice" in the statute for the ICTR gives the tribunal an
"inherent power to control its own proceedings."5 3 The Norman tribunal from
the SCSL refused the defendant's last-minute motion for self-representation,
contending that the "duty" of the court is "to protect the integrity of the
proceedings before [it] and to ensure that the administration of justice is not
brought into disrepute.'
The "fair and expeditious" rationale has become a popular judicial standard
at international war crimes tribunals.55 It allows them to retract certain wellestablished rights if they substantially interfere with overall fairness. The Milosevic
case and issues surrounding self-representation are simply its most recent
manifestation.

49

50

Prosecutor v Kunarac, Case No IT-96-23/IT-96-23/1, Decision on the Request of the Accused
Radomir Kovac to Allow Mr. Milan Vujin to Appear as Co-Counsel Acting Pro Bono, 9 (Mar
14, 2000).
Prosecutor v Delalic, Case No IT-96-21, Order on the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel Due to
Confilict [sic] of Interest, 8 (June 24, 1999).
21.

51

BarayaguiZa,ICTR-97-19-T at

52

Id.

53

Id at

54

Norman, SCSL-04-14-T-125 at

55

It remains to be seen how the Iraqi Special Tribunal will try defendants in its jurisdiction. Like its
international war tribunal counterparts, it has a mandate to conduct "fair and expeditious"
proceedings. The Statute for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (2005), art 21, S (b), available online at
<http://www.iraq-ist.org/en/about/sec8.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005). It may therefore approach
the same issues in a similar manner.

9 (Gunawardana concurring).

Winter 2006
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II. SELF-REPRESENTATION AND MILOSEVIC UNDER THE ICTY
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

In Article 21, one of the "minimum guarantees" that the ICTY Statute
offers to a defendant is the right to "defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing." Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 6 a plain reading of this statute reveals that the defendant5 7 has a choice
to either represent himself or seek the assistance of counsel at trial.
The ICTY failed to consider the large amount of international law
codifying the right as fundamental.5 8 The statutes for the SCSL,"9 the ICTR, °
and the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court 61 all recognize the
right. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),62 the
European Convention on Human. Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("ECHRFF"), 63 and the American Convention on Human Rights64 contain

similar provisions. In Michael & Brian Hill v Spain, the United Nations Human
Rights Committee held that Spain had violated the plaintiff's right to selfrepresentation pursuant to Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR by appointing counsel

56

(1969), art 31, § (1), 1155 UN Treaty Ser 331, 340 (1980). Article 31(1) reads: "A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." The ICTY has used the Vienna
Convention before in its interpretation of the ICTY Statute and Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. See Milosevic, IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision at 31; Tadic, IT-94-1 at 18.

57

But see Sesejl, IT-03-67-PT at 29 (arguing that "[i]t would be a misunderstanding of the word
Ior' in the phrase 'to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing' to
conclude that self-representation excludes the appointment of counsel to assist the Accused or
vice versa").
Cherif Bassiouni, Human R'gbts in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural
Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 Duke J Comp & Intl L 235, 283
(1993). Bassiouni later argues, however, that "in the best interest of justice and in the interest of
adequate and effective representation of the accused, the court should disallow self-representation
and appoint professional counsel." Id.

58

60

Art 17, § 4(d), available online at <hrtp://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html> (visited Oct 27, 2005).
Art 20, § 4(d), available online at <www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html> (visited

61

Oct 27, 2005).
(1998), art 67,

§

62

63).
(1966), art 14,

§ 3(d),

63

(1950), art 6, § 3(d), 213 UN Treaty Set 222, 228 (1955).

64

(1969), art 8,

59

1(d), 37 ILM 999, 1040 (recognizing this right subject to reservations of Article

§ (2)(d),

999 UN Treaty Ser 171,177 (1976).
1144 UN Treaty Set 123, 147 (1979).
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even though such a right does not exist under Spanish law.65 The right to selfrepresentation is also valued in common law jurisdictions.6 6
67
While there are restrictions on self-representation in international law,
there is no evidence of its conditionality in the ICTY Statute. Without definitive
statutory evidence that could legitimize its order, the Appeals Chamber
rationalized its decision by emphasizing that self-representation is limited in
sexual abuse cases even in common law countries where the right is more widely
recognized.6" The reason for this particular limitation is to prevent alleged
abusers from cross-examining and possibly intimidating their victims. While
Milosevic is charged with heinous crimes, the same intimidation risk would not
be present as he is not charged with crimes against specific individuals.
Additionally, it is unlikely that he would call victims of genocide when
conducting his defense. Any threat of intimidation or psychological harm that
would otherwise justify a restriction thus does not exist.
The Appeal Chamber's reliance on Rule 80(B) is similarly unconvincing.
While the "in his presence" and "to defend himself in person" provisions are
located in the same clause, Rule 80(B) only limits the former. There is no
corresponding rule in the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence that allows
the Tribunal to impose counsel on the defendant. Reasoning that the Tribunal
has this power because Rule 80(B) restricts the "in his presence" right, which
happens to be in the "to defend himself in person" clause, stretches the
boundaries of responsible statutory interpretation. Had the drafters intended to
restrict the pro se defense right in some way, they would have presumably
included a provision that stipulates this check and the circumstances when it
should be applied.
Furthermore, the text of Article 21 section (4)(d) only envisions instances
when the defendant may be "assigned," not imposed, counsel "where the
interests of justice so require."6 9 To understand these interests, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence is instructive. Instances "[w]henever the
interests of justice so demand" are exclusively related to cases in which

65

Hill v Spain in United Nations, Report of theHuman Rights Committee, UN GAOR 52d Sess, UN Doc

A/52/40 5,18 (1999).

67

See, for example, Faretta,422 US at 819; R v Woodward, (1944) KB 118, 118. But see Marlinet v
Calfornia Courtof Appeal, 528 US 152, 163 (2000) (holding that the right to apro se defense will not
be granted on appeal). The right to self-representation is not as well respected in civil law
jurisdictions. Jorgensen, 98 Am J Ind L at 714-15 (cited in note 16).
Jorgensen, 98 AmJ Ind L at 715-18 (cited in note 16).

68

Milosevic, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal at

69

The relevant provision is cited in note 36.

66

Winter 2006
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defendants "lack the means to remunerate such counsel."70 The Directive on
Assignment of Defence Counsel ("Directive") 71 lends further support to this
understanding of Rule 80(B). According to Article 6, defendants who cannot
afford counsel "shall be entitled to assignment of counsel." Articles 7 and 8 set
out criteria for determining if the defendant financially qualifies. This right to
counsel when financially eligible must be understood, however, "[w]ithout
prejudice to the right of the Accused to conduct his own defense." 72 Nowhere
in the Directive is there a provision that allows the Tribunal to impose counsel
through its own fiat. The text of the Directive therefore forecloses any reading
that the "interests of justice" give the Tribunal free reign to assign counsel to
defendants who wish to retain exclusive control over their cases. 73
Tribunal case law does not resolve the issue of self-representation in
Milosevic. In Sesel/, the Tribunal found that the right to self-representation "is not
absolute." 4 This decision rested partly on evidence that the accused had acted in
an "obstructionist fashion" and had a "need for legal assistance. , 71 In Milosevic,
the numerous delays have been health-related and the Tribunal never intimated
that Milosevic required legal assistance. Furthermore, the Sese!/ tribunal held that
"standby counsel" could be imposed on defendants.7 6 Its holding should thus
not be expanded to include the imposition of primary counsel on defendants in
a war crimes tribunal. BarayagwiZa is also inapplicable because in that case,
defense counsel filed a motion to be withdrawn following the defendant's
request.77 Viewing this motion "as an attempt to obstruct judicial proceedings,"
the ICTR rejected it because there were no "most exceptional circumstances"
that normally would have justified removal pursuant to the prevailing rules of
procedure. 78 Milosevic involves the assignment of counsel on a defendant who
exercised a procedural right that arises under the ICTY Statute. Barayagwiza's
holding is therefore irrelevant because both the facts and issue in Milosevic are
different.
70

Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 45 (cited in note 29).

71

The Directive on Assignment of Defence Counsel (2004) is available online at <http://www.
un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005).
Id at art 5.

72

73

But see Sesejl, IT-03-67-PT at 21; Barayagwia, ICTR-97-19-7-T at 9 (Gunawardana concurring)
(both cases have a much broader interpretation of the "interests of justice").

74

Sesel, IT-03-67-PT at

75

Id at 23.
Id at 30. See also McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 US 168, 177-78 (1984) (holding that standby counsel
may be imposed on a defendant if the defendant "preserve[s] actual control over the case" and
the jury is made aware that the defendant is in control).

76

77
78

20.

Barayagizva,ICTR-97-19-7-T at
Id at
20-25.

2-3.
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In a more recent case from the SCSL, the defendant moved to conduct his
defense pro se on the first day of the trial. The Trial Chamber declined the
request "in the interests of justice" and held it could not grant such a last-minute
motion.7 9 In addition to the delay of the request, a primary consideration in its
8
decision was that the defendant was jointly tried with two other individuals. " If
the request for a pro se defense were granted, it feared that inevitable delays
would have jeopardized the other defendants and the presentation of their cases.
The same danger of injustice or delay does not exist in Milosevic's case as he has
consistently asserted his right to apro se defense and is being tried alone. Finally
in Croissant, the European Court of Human Rights held that counsel could be
8
imposed on the defendant without violating Articles 3 and 6 of the ECHRFF. '
Unlike the defendant in Croissant,Milosevic has not sought legal assistance, has
asserted his right to a pro se defense, and has objected to the assignment of any
counsel. Croissantis thus only tangentially relevant to Milosevic's case at best.
American jurisprudence is also only of limited applicability. The Supreme
Court held that a defendant has the right to defend himself pro se under the Sixth
Amendment. 82 Under certain circumstances, a court may qualify the right if the
83
defendant "deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct."
While the Tribunal entertained arguments from the prosecution that Milosevic
failed to take his medication to delay the trial,84 it never found that Milosevic
intentionally delayed the proceedings. Given Faretta's focus on purposeful
obstruction, the Tribunal claimed that unintentional interference, including
85
physical and mental ailments, may also justify the imposition of counsel.
86 Unlike
Milosevic's condition, however, is not "permanent" and has improved.
79
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Id at 834 n 46, citing Illinois v Allen, 397 US 337 (1970) (Brennan concurring).
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Milosevic, IT-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision at 67. The Appeals Chamber has declined to review
this issue because it is reluctant to make fact-finding conclusions on interlocutory appeal. Milosevic,
IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal at n 55.
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Milosevic, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal at 14, citing Savage v Estelle, 924
F2d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir 1990) (holding that a defendant with a speech impediment could not
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courtroom protocol" under McKaskle);Johnson v State, 17 P3d 1008, 1017 (Nev 2001) (holding that
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deteriorated his condition).
18. During the summer of
Milosevic, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal at
2004, the Tribunal assigned doctors to monitor Milosevic's health. Their prognosis was that there
was a "risk" that the trial would exacerbate Milosevic's health which would lead to further delays.
Id at 6. However, his condition has since improved. Id at 18. No new evidence was presented
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the stutter in Savage and the serious mental condition in Johnson, Milosevic's
health does not threaten to interfere with the trial indefinitely. Accordingly there
is no need or justification to assign counsel in the present case.87
III. THE UNSUITABILITY OF "FAIR AND EXPEDITIOUS" IN
ICTY JURISPRUDENCE
With statutory interpretation and case law incapable of supporting an
imposition of counsel, the "fair and expeditious" standard is the only remaining
argument that could validate the restriction of the pro se defense. According to
ICTY jurisprudence, delays are the very antithesis of fairness because they
encumber adjudication. The United States Supreme Court presented a similar
argument, writing that "[e]ven at the trial level.., the government's interest in
ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the 88trial at times outweighs the
defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer.
Such a concern cannot be easily dismissed.89 Milosevic's health has already
delayed the prosecution's case and has resulted in a six month gap between the
prosecutor's and the accused's cases-in-chief. If such delays continue, the
defense will possibly lose the requisite focus and momentum to serve as a
meaningful rebuttal to the prosecution's charges. Milosevic's illness may also
render him an ineffective advocate on his own behalf at trial. Both scenarios
would be unfair because Milosevic could neither present nor receive the best
possible defense to which he is entitled.
The order also serves a greater range of interests. As the Norman tribunal
noted: the "role of Defence Counsel. . . is meant to serve, not only the interests
of his client, but also those of the Court and overall interests of justice."9 The
imposition of counsel could logically serve two distinct interests. First, it can
vindicate the rights and memories of the victims and assuage the pain of the
survivors by ensuring that Milosevic and other alleged participants in the

88

that the trial would have the same adverse effect on Milosevic's health. Therefore, Milosevic's
condition does not pose the serious risk of delaying the trial both in terms of its potential and
magnitude.
MartineZalso offers no support because Milosevic has not attempted to assert the right to apro se
defense on appeal. 528 US at 163 (holding that Faretta does not guarantee the right to selfrepresentation on appeal).
Id at 162.
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genocide are found guilty.91 Second, the ICTY's decision guarantees that the
progress of the trial remains steady regardless of the defendant's ignorance,
illness, or, for that matter, recalcitrance. In this way, the ICTY makes it clear that
it is fully capable of asserting its judicial authority.92
The evidence and practical considerations nevertheless militate against the
ICTY's decision. For one, Milosevic's health has stabilized. The modalities of
the order reflect this change and tacitly acknowledge his ability to conduct his
own defense. In addition, the events following the order contradict the "fair and
expeditious" rationale because they have only protracted the trial.9 3 Last, further
delays undermining the Tribunal's attempt to achieve the incantation of "fair
and expeditious" justice may occur. While the modalities of the order could be
interpreted as a means of baiting Milosevic into some form of cooperation, the
assignment of counsel may only encourage his obstinacy and may continue to
postpone proceedings. This is the opposite, albeit foreseeable,94 consequence of
the ICTY's decision. These observations should force the ICTY to reconsider
the order and ultimately reverse it.
On a more theoretical level, judicial management should not justify the
circumscription of the pro se defense right. Such a consideration is of immense
importance to any court or tribunal, but an exclusive adherence to it interferes
with the ICTY's adversarial system.95 In this framework, both sides are
91

92

For an excellent discussion of the psychological effect of the prosecution of war criminals and
human rights violators on victims and their families, see Jamie O'Connell, Gambling with the Pyche:
Does ProsecutingHuman Rights Violators Console their Victims?, 46 Harv Intl L J 295 (2005).
For the importance and dangers of relying on the Tribunal's "inherent powers," see generally,
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Powers: A Potpourr of(Questions and Notes, in Richard May, et al, eds, Essays on ICTY Procedure and
Evidence: In Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald 387 (Kluwer Law International 2001). See also,
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Counsel's Motion at
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responsible for presenting their own cases without extensive interference from
the presiding judge. There is thus a resultant freedom, indeed responsibility, to
present arguments and facts however they wish to further their respective
interests. Imposing counsel on a defendant who wishes to conduct his
proceedings as he chooses substantially interferes with this defining
characteristic of the adversarial system.9 6
Expeditious and fair proceedings are a poor proxy for "justice" and
"fairness." While judicial economy is a legitimate interest, adjudication cannot be
subjected exclusively to this goal. The obligation of the ICTY is to try
defendants to approximate the truth of the allegations against them. Such a
pursuit demands time and a faithful adherence to the rules to certify that all of
the relevant facts and arguments, as presented by the parties, are understood and
considered. The gravity of the offenses in question and the possibly severe
penalties imposed further confirm the importance and need for just proceedings.
By focusing on accuracy and upholding substantive and procedural rights,
the ICTY would increase its legitimacy in the court of public opinion. Present
and future generations will not exclusively judge the ICTY on the relative speed
with which it administers justice and the number of convictions that it secures.
The focus will also be on how justice is rendered.9" Given the skepticism that
has characterized the international community's reception of the ICTY, a
reaffirmation of the Tribunal's respect for the dictates of its statutes, rules of
procedure, and international law will send a symbolic message that it is serious
about responsibly administering justice. Trampling on its law by curtailing the
right to self-representation would certainly convey the opposite image. This is
not to suggest that the ICTY should adjudicate to win the most points in a
public approval poll. However, some sensitivity to how it is perceived and
judged in its most publicized case will benefit the ICTY as it continues to try war
criminals from the former Yugoslavia.
Such a self-conscious administration of justice will have benefits outside of
the 1CTY. War crimes tribunals such as ICTR, SCSL, and the Iraqi Special
Tribunal will also be better received as they fulfill their respective mandates. The
nascent International Criminal Court would similarly benefit from a well-
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T-125 at 26. At the ICTR, the purpose of the trial is likewise "to obtain efficient representation
and adversarial proceedings." BarayagwiZa, ICTR-97-19-7-T at 21.
Milosevic, IT-02-54, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution Motion at 24.
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established and well-respected ICTY and its precedents. Through its practices
and holdings, the ICTY could effectively serve as a model for these institutions
98
and influence the creation of an "international criminal procedure." Before
assuming such an influential role, the Tribunal must be certain to respect its laws
by first recognizing that it has no authority to impose counsel on Milosevic.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tribunal recognized the impact of its decision, stating that the
"assignment of counsel against the wishes of the accused is a developing area of
99
the law both in national and international jurisdictions." This Development
argues that the ICTY has weighed in on the wrong side of the issue. There is no
statutory or precedential support that validates the decision. Moreover, the "fair
and expeditious" rationale cannot justify its holding because it reduces justice to
a judicial afterthought. The ICTY should therefore reconsider and ultimately
reject its decision to appoint counsel for Milosevic. In addition to reinforcing the
ICTY's own authority, a reversal would show that present and future
international tribunals will faithfully execute their missions to try defendants
regardless of delays caused by illness or posturing from ousted political leaders.
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